Our analysis focuses on large industrial companies. They account for a high proportion of output and employment and pose the greatest challenge for reform: many of them are overstaffed and need a lot of painful restructuring before they may become profitable, and it is difficult to find private investors for them.
We distinguish two idealtypical approaches which lead to two different governance structures for these companies in the transition period. Proponents of the market approach argue that the best way to proceed is to privatize as fast as possible by distributing the shares of large state owned companies in one way or another to the general population. Given the lack of entrepreneurs and the atomistic ownership structure resulting from a mass distribu-tion scheme financial intermediaries (like holding companies, mutual funds, pension funds, or investment banks) will come in and play a crucial role in the transition period. They will diversify risk and actively control the managers of the companies they own. Kornai (1990) and Shieifer and Vishny (1992) .
See e.g. Fischer (1991 (1991) and Fischer (1991) . We do not consider proposals to give or sell the companies to their employees. For a discussion of some of the problems involved with labor managed firms see Hinds (1990) . Bonin (1992) Bos (1991) and Sinn (1991) . An overview of the programs in other countries can be found in RFE/RL Research Report (1992 To ensure competitive market conditions the government should commit to a free trade policy. As far as non-tradables or natural monopolies are concerned, antitrust laws and regulatory authorities as in western economies will be necessary.
The social costs of adjustment will be very high during the transition period, but they are unavoidable. The government should not interfere with the market to slow down the process.
For a discussion of the mechanics of the voucher scheme which is being used in Czechoslovakia see Brada (1992 Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) . Milgrom and Roberts (1992, p. 221) summarize the results of the literature on performance pay in the "Incentive Intensity Principle": The optimal intensity of incentives depends on four factors: the incremental profits created by additional effort, the precision with which the desired activities can be assessed, the agent's risk tolerance, and the agent's responsiveness to incentives." Our main argument here is that during the transition period the measurement precision will be so poor that the incentive intensity has to be very small. For an interesting application of this principle in a western industrialized country see Ghemawat (1992) .
See Shleifer and Summers (1988) and Schnitzer (1992) (4) i.e. the manager equals marginal private benefits with marginal costs. Suppose that V^-A, > y,, i.e. it would be socially efficient to shut down the firm in case of a failure.
Comparing (6) and (4) 
because F, > V/' and A,-= Af + AJ" + Af. Hence, concavity of p, (-) 
Comparing (12) to (6) it is clear that qiiaU) AT < AT .
Note that (13) Goldfeld and Quandt (1991) analyze the impact of such a policy on input demands of the firm.
•'This argument does not hold for the case of Germany. For a more subtle argument why privatization in western industrialized countries can be a commitment device to restrict the amount of subsidies see Schmidt (1990) . For other models of the soft-budget constraint see Goldfeld and Quandt (1991) and Schaffer (1989 where a^and a^are characterized by (6) and (12) Lipton and Sachs (1990) and Blanchard et.al. (1991) 
